Table 1: Explicit Incentives and Social Preferences: Experimental Evidence
Note: The 'Comment' column provides interpretations of the results (quotations are from the cited papers). Bold letters refer to the four mechanisms ( Bowles (2008) ) that account for with non-separability that are likely to be involved in the cited experiment: F, framing; E, endogenous preferences; I, information provided by the incentives and S, self-determination. C refers to cases in which incentives and social preferences are complementary (or synergistic). All effects are statistically significant (at the ten percent level or better) unless noted. 
Trust and Dictator game
• Face-to-face pre-play and post-play communication • Possible post-play monetary punishment • Finitely repeated and one shot.
Repetition and communication increase amount sent and returned; the option of punishment for low offers reduces offers of other regarding trustees "The availability of punishment destroys intrinsic trust and lowers people's willingness to reward trust" (p.1) I, F Bohnet, Frey, and Huck (2001) U.S. students
Contract enforcement game (finitely repeated)
• Different legal institutions (low, medium or high contract enforcement probability)
• Low contract enforcement in the last rounds for all sessions. Subjects implemented the selfinterested level of contribution under the mechanism, but contributed substantially more than the self interested level in its absence (until late in the 20 period experiments) (e.g. Figure 5 ). After experiencing the mechanism subjects contributed 26 percent less in its absence (than those who had not experienced it).
By rewarding contributions and penalizing shirkers the mechanism may have relieved subjects' sense of moral responsibility and legitimated the pursuit of self interest. The effects persisted after the withdrawal of the mechanism. F, I, E • An " impartial reasoning device" (in which self interested S's will give equal weight to the interests of all parties) • In the first stage, with or without the impartial device. In the second stage, without the device.
• Communication (after each round) only for the first stage.
In the first stage, the device supports higher levels of cooperation than without it. The subjects' concern for fairness (elicited by questionnaire) and contributions to the public good were statistically unrelated under the device but were highly correlated in the standard game (without the device)
The impartial device made the pursuit of self interest ethically justifiable and hence "undermines ethical reasoning and ethically motivated behavior". (1995, p.44 • Roles assigned by contest (the right to be the Proposer is 'earned') or randomly assigned).
• Different frame: Exchange" game (between a "seller" and a "buyer") or no frame • Anonymity: Double blind or not Offers are lower and fewer low offers are rejected in an exchange context or when the proposer earns the right to his role. Proposer accurately gauged willingness of responders to accept lower offers. Dictators send lower amounts in double blind.
Institutional cues affect behavior: with property rights (i.e. legitimate 'earning' right to be proposer), a market framing or total anonymity, proposers and responders are more selfregarding S, F Houser, Xiao, McCabe, and Smith (2007) U.S. students (532)
Gift Exchange game
• Punishment as an incentive contract (i.e. a fine) • Intention treatment: Punishment is assigned randomly (by nature) or imposed by investors (intentional) When back-transfer requests are high in relation to the sanction's size, regardless of whether the request is fair and regardless of whether punishment is intentional, punishment incentives have detrimental effects on the amount returned.
"Subjects interpret punishment as the price for self-interested behavior and the price, regardless of whether it was intentionally imposed, is an excuse for selfishness" (p.15) F, I Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005) German students (84) Gift exchange game • Different explicit incentives contracts: with Trust (pure fixed wage contract) or with a compensation (i.e., piece rate) (the principal can choose)
• Two different sequences for the contracts Incentives reduce cooperation (i.e. effort level) and the effect persists after the incentive is removed. Where principals are constrained to offer fixed wages effort levels of agents are considerably higher than when employers can choose an incentive contract.
Incentives (price rate) alter principals' and agents' perception of the situation: "lead agents to adopt an individual maximization frame ... rather than a cooperative frame," "agents have a stronger concern for the principal's wellbeing in the pure fixed wage setting." F, I, E Meier (2007) Swiss students (11.379) Contributions to funds to support financially needy other students.
• For a single semester subjects' contributions not matched or matched at high or low rates. No matching in subsequent periods
Matching increased contributions when they were in force. Those who experienced matching subsequently were substantially less likely to make a contribution to either fund; average contributions showed a small, insignificant negative net effect of the incentive.
The negative matching effect is probably not due to the information it conveyed on the neediness of the funds (larger effect for the smaller matching rate) or to the subjects' desire to compensate for higher matching induced contributions in the treatment period The monetary incentive may make it more difficult to signal social preferences, diminishing the signaling value of contributing. Charity option Ross and Ward (1996) Stanford University students Prisoners' dilemma Game was labeled "Wall Street Game" or "Community Game"
Rates of individual and pair cooperation were twice as high in the "Community Game" than in the "Wall Street Game"
Institutional names suggested appropriate behavior, possibly affect-ed beliefs re the actions of others. F,I Rustrom (2002) • Punishment for low contributions applied either exogenously or by peers to i) all subjects, ii) a single subject, iii) no subjects.
Punishment of all subjects (treatment i) raised contribution of a given subject by more than when this subject alone was liable to punishment (treatment ii) despite the payoff incentives for this subject being identical in the two treatments.
Synergy of incentives and social preferences. Knowledge that if others defected they would be punished and the expectation that as a result they would contribute activated the subject's conditional willingness to contribute to the public good. I, C 11 Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) U.S. students (84, 56, 133) PD, n-person social dilemmas
• Different enforceable levels of incentives (social dilemma): Weak, strong and no sanction • Different frame A weak sanctioning system results in less cooperation than no sanctioning system; sanctions affect the type of decision people perceive they are making, prompting them to see it as a business rather than an ethical decision. Subjects evaluated sanction treatment as 'business' rather than 'ethical' Weak (strong) sanctions reduce (increase) cooperation; no effect of sanctions for those adopting an ethical frame. "Within an ethical frame, cooperation ... will not be influenced by economic considerations such as sanction strength, while within a business frame, cooperation will depend on the strength of the sanctioning system" p.700). F Tyran and Feld (2006) Swiss students (102) Public goods game
• Levels of sanctions (none, mild, severe) • Enforcement: external (i.e. experimenter-imposed) or self-imposed (by voting)
Exogenously imposed mild law does not significantly affect average contributions to the public good.
Compliance is much improved if mild law is endogenously chosen.
If the enforcement is selfimposed it does not indicate hostile intent and also induces expectations of others' cooperation (people tend to comply with the law if they expect many others to do so). If mild law is rejected in the referendum, compliance tends to be lower than without the law. I, F Upton (1974) U.S blood donors
Blood donation places
• With and without a monetary compensations to give blood
Among subjects who had previously given more frequently, or whose self report of motivation to give blood was higher, the promise of monetary compensation was associated with significantly lower probability of subsequent giving. Less motivated individuals exhibited no effect (previous giving) or a positive effect (self reported motivation).
Results may have occurred because of over-justification and resulting compromised selfdetermination, or because compensation reduced the selfaffirmation-as-altruistic aspect of giving, or because of selection bias in recruitment (Titmuss (1971 ) Arrow (1972 ) Bliss (1972 ) I, S, F
